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In the present paper, we will apply the predictive and reactive control systems (PARCS)
theory as a framework that integrates competing theories of neural substrates of
awareness by describing the “default mode network” (DMN) and anterior insula (AI) as
parts of two different behavioral and homeostatic control systems. The DMN, a network
that becomes active at rest when there is no external stimulation or task to perform,
has been implicated in self-reﬂective awareness and prospection. By contrast, the AI is
associated with awareness and task-related attention. This has led to competing theories
stressing the role of the DMN in self-awareness vs. the role of interoceptive and emotional
information integration in the AI in awareness of the emotional moment. In PARCS,
the respective functions of the DMN and AI in a speciﬁc control system explains their
association with different qualities of awareness, and how mental states can shift from
one state (e.g., prospective self-reﬂection) to the other (e.g., awareness of the emotional
moment) depending on the relative dominance of control systems. These shifts between
reactive and predictive control are part of processes that enable the intake of novel
information, integration of this novel information within existing knowledge structures, and
the creation of a continuous personal context in which novel information can be integrated
and understood. As such, PARCS can explain key characteristics of mental states, such as
their temporal and spatial focus (e.g., a focus on the here and now vs. the future; a ﬁrst
person vs. a third person perspective). PARCS further relates mental states to brain states
and functions, such as activation of the DMN or hemispheric asymmetry in frontal cortical
functions.Together, PARCS deepens the understanding of a broad range of mental states,
including mindfulness, mind wandering, rumination, autobiographical memory, imagery,
and the experience of self.
Keywords: mindfulness, default mode network, insula, imagery, rumination, observer perspective, self-reflection,
prospection
INTRODUCTION
People’s mental lives shift from moment to moment between
states that differ in the level and quality of awareness of inner
experience or the external world. Some mental experiences may
be occupied by current events in the external environment, yet
others by contents from episodic memory. But how and when
does one mental state give way to another? And do internally
directed mental states and shifts toward externally directed men-
tal states have relevant functions? What exactly discriminates
mental states that appear overlapping (e.g., ruminative vs. other
kinds of mind wandering)? We think that to answer these ques-
tions psychologists require an integrative account on the basis
of relevant brain mechanisms. In the present paper, we seek
such an integrative account, and suggest that shifts between
mental states, as well as characteristics of those mental states,
represent workings of only a small set of control systems in
the brain that control behavior, cognition, homeostasis, and
emotion.
But how can we understand internally directed mental states?
Traditionally, researchers have not paid much attention to these
states, as most research has been directed to the workings of
externally directed mental states and cognitive functions through
the performance of a number of different tasks. In contrast
to this typical approach, some researchers have recently started
investigating neural networks during resting states, and espe-
cially what has been dubbed the “default mode network” (DMN;
Raichle et al., 2001). The DMN becomes active at rest in case
no external stimulation – such as a cognitive task offered in a
typical study – is provided to perform, and may be implicated
in internally directed and self-reﬂective cognition. In contrast
to this putative association with self-awareness, activity in this
area is inversely correlated in functional-imaging studies with
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the activation in the anterior insula (AI) that is associated with
awareness and task-related attention (Craig, 2009). The inverse
correlation between the DMN and the AI has led to competing
theories of the neural substrates of something of direct rele-
vance to internally directed mental states, awareness, stressing
either the role of the DMN in self-awareness (Boly et al., 2008;
Greicius et al., 2008; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010) or the role of
interoceptive and emotional information integration in the AI
in subjective feeling and awareness of the emotional moment
(Craig, 2009). We are not aware of previous theoretical attempts
to integrate these different aspects or qualities of awareness in one
framework.
In the present paper, we will apply the theory of predictive and
reactive control systems (PARCS; Tops et al., 2010) to suggest that
the DMN and AI each belong to one of two different behavioral
and homeostatic control systems, and we will explain this guided
by our knowledge on internally directed mental states. The respec-
tive functions of the DMN and AI in a speciﬁc control system
explains their association with different mental states or qualities
of awareness, while it also explains how mental states can shift
from one state to another depending on the relative dominance of
one control system or interactions between the systems.
We think that PARCS is relevant for explaining internally
directed mental states, as the theory is based on fundamental dif-
ferences in the way novel information is processed compared to
familiar information, the relevance of which we explain below. In
particular we focus on how cognition and behavior are controlled
in novel or unpredictable circumstances compared to familiar and
predictable circumstances. As outlined in earlier work (Tops et al.,
2010, 2014a), the brain relies on reactive control systems apply-
ing feedback-guided control for handling novelty. By contrast,
in familiar circumstances the brain relies on predictive control
guided by internal models shaped during previous learning. In
the present paper, we aim to explicate how internally (compared
to externally) directed mental states derive from these reactive or
predictive control systems, and how shifts between internally and
externally directed mental states are explained by shifts between
reactive and predictive control. For instance, learning a novel but
predictable task ﬁrst requires involvement of the reactive control
system for handling novelty, but, after the forming of internal
working models, the predictive system will take over and con-
trol will become more habitual, allowing for internally directed
mental states, often expressed in people’s wandering of their own
mind.
In Section“The Theory of Predictive and Reactive Control Sys-
tems,” we summarize the main tenets of PARCS. This description
will include an integration of DMN’s functions into the predic-
tive system. In forming a coherent framework of a sense of self,
we further discuss the crucial role of the AI in the reactive con-
trol system. In so doing, we partly offer a reinterpretation of
Craig’s (2009) theory of interoceptive awareness. We will also
discuss the role of left hemisphere areas in “translating” between
reactive and predictive control (i.e., in assimilating novel infor-
mation to preexisting internal models). In exploring these links,
we further elaborate upon PARCS than was done previously
(e.g., Tops et al., 2010). In Section “The Dynamics of Reactive
and Predictive Control Systems in Internally Directed Cognition
and Mindfulness.” we explain how PARCS predicts and explains
characteristics of internally directed cognition, such as in rumina-
tion, mind wandering, experience of self, prospection, and the
ﬁeld and observer perspectives in imagery and autobiographi-
cal memory. We apply those characteristics, such as temporal
and spatial focus of awareness, to help understand the state of
mindfulness and the processes that lead to getting into a mindful
state, a topic that has been captured the recent attention of many
researchers. The discussion of mindfulness in Section “Accept-
ing without Judgment” is therefore a way to synergize externally
and internally directed mental states. In Section “Discussion,”
we consider our main conclusions, alongside PARCS’ broader
implications for understanding and studying internally directed
cognition.
THE THEORY OF PREDICTIVE AND REACTIVE CONTROL
SYSTEMS
SYSTEMS FOR REACTIVE vs. PREDICTIVE CONTROL
Before we discuss how the DMN functions as part of a larger over-
arching system, let us turn to the basic underlying structures that
enablemammals to deal with their environment. Support has been
accumulating that mammalian brain systems contain two cortical
systems controlling behavior, a reactive and a predictive control
system (reviewed in Tucker and Luu, 2007; Tops et al., 2010).
An anterior temporal–ventrolateral prefrontal cortical [including
the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), AI, anterior hippocampal for-
mation, ventral striatum, and amygdala] system is specialized in
processing novel, salient, and urgent stimuli and in reactive (e.g.,
feedback-guided) control of behavior in unpredictable environ-
ments. Reactive control thus represents a specialized mode of
operation for detecting new information, encoding it in mem-
ory and assimilating it into preexisting internal models, thus
facilitating future control by the predictive system (Hasher and
Zacks, 1979; Tops and Boksem, 2011a). By contrast, a posterior
medial–dorsal cortical system [including the posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC) and precuneus] processes familiar stimuli and con-
trols behavior in predictable environments, guided by predictive
internal models, including models of others and self. In effect,
these models include, but are not limited to, what attachment
theorists have called “internal working models” (Bowlby, 1988),
a topic we will venture into later. Prediction and internal models
in the dorsal system allow for feedforward and partly automated
action control, thereby reducing the necessity to devote atten-
tion to external cues. Increased feedforward control means that
a greater amount of action steps are programed and performed
in a ﬂuent sequence, without waiting for feedback between each
step.
The reactive guidance by momentary environmental stimuli is
associated with attentional focus on stimuli that are urgent and
close in time and space. Those stimuli can be positive (“I have
to catch that reward that is in my reach before it gets away”) or
negative (“I have to get away from that danger before it gets me,
because I’m in its reach”). The reactive control system is involved
in, and relates stimuli to, the experienced self in the here and
now. By contrast, there is typically less urgency and focus on the
moment (i.e., broader, more global focus in time and space) when
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behavior is guided predictively (in feedforward fashion) by inter-
nal models. The characteristics of reactive and predictive control
are discussed in more detail elsewhere (Tops et al., 2010, 2013a,b;
Tops and Boksem, 2011a, 2012). We summarized them here in
Table 1.
It is important to note that PARCS is not built around the
concepts reactive and predictive. Rather, we use the terms reac-
tive and predictive as labels to refer to functional systems that
combine a set of features that together are optimal in controlling
behavior and physiology in unpredictable or predictable circum-
stances. For example, some features of the reactive system do not
ﬁt at all to the label reactive (e.g., sustained attentional control or
active maintenance of task goals by the reactive system). Moreover,
each system contains certain features that are evolutionarily older
and seem more primitive (e.g., related to reactivity, impulsivity,
stimulus controlled) while other features of the same system are
evolutionarily more recent and appear at a higher (e.g., cogni-
tive control, reﬂective) level. Predictive control by internal models
– and the chances of focusing one’s mental state inward – may
have evolved later and at ﬁrst glance appear more “sophisticated”
than reactive control. However, the point we want to make is that
both systems are continuing to evolve and have both developed
higher-level control. In the next section, we further describe and
illustrate the development of higher-level control in the predictive
and reactive systems by taking the DMN and AI as respec-
tive examples of those larger systems. In turn, in Section “The
Dynamics of Reactive and Predictive Control Systems in Internally
Directed Cognition and Mindfulness,” we apply our distinction
between reactive and predictive control to explicate the differ-
ing characteristics of internally directed cognition across different
contexts.
THE DEFAULT MODE NETWORK AS PART OF THE PREDICTIVE SYSTEM
The DMN has recently been associated with activity in case no
external stimulation was offered to participants, but the literature
has suggested functions beyond inactivity. PARCS suggests the
DMN (together with the dorsal executive network) – beyond
being involved with such inactive states – to be part of a pre-
dictive control system. There are a number of converging lines
of research supporting this view. First, in contrast to the reactive
system that incorporates fast associative learning, the predictive
system is specialized in guiding behavior by internal models that
are formed in long-term memory and kept stable by slow learning
of the environment’s predictability. The DMN consists of brain
areas involved in the predictive system, including in the PCC,
precuneus, angular gyrus, medial temporal lobe, and medial pre-
frontal cortex (mPFC;Raichle et al., 2001). Second, beyondactivity
in case of no external stimulation, this network also becomes
active when individuals engage in internally focused tasks includ-
ing autobiographical memory retrieval, envisioning the future,
long-term script processing and conceiving the perspectives of
others (Ruby et al., 2002; Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Jack et al.,
2012), which is consistent with the role of the dorsal system in
predictive behavioral control. Other parts of the predictive con-
trol system are the dorsal executive network that consists of the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; Seeley et al., 2007) and
the dorsal attentional system (Shulman et al., 2009). The areas
of the DMN are connected to the dorsolateral striatum, ante-
rior thalamus, and DLPFC (see Tucker and Luu, 2007; Tops et al.,
2010).
The functions typically ascribed to the DMN run parallel to
functions in behavior control by internal models that we described
earlier to be part of PARCS’ predictive system (Tops et al., 2010,
2013a, 2014a; cf. Tucker and Luu, 2007). Much similar, Buck-
ner and Carroll (2007) have suggested the DMN to support the
performance of internal mentation. This network may provide a
platform for putting together dynamic mental models and scenar-
ios that are largely detached from the speciﬁc or current external
world, all abilities relevant for focusing one’s attention inward.
In previous work, we have referred to these mental models and
Table 1 | Characteristics of the reactive and predictive control systems.
Reactive system Predictive system
Origin Paleocortical Archicortical
Visceral functional base Viscerosensory Visceromotor
Cortical network Ventrolateral Dorsomedial
Central areas IFG, AI, temporo-parietal junction, anterior hippocampal
formation, ventral striatum, amygdala
PCC, precuneus, angular gyrus, parahippocampal cortex,
posterior hippocampal formation, mPFC, DLPFC
Environment/situation Low-predictable, changing High-predictable, stable
Triggering stimuli Novelty Familiarity
Cognitive mode Object/context free Conﬁgural/internal model
Motor control Feedback/reactive Feedforward/predictive
Learning stage Early Late
Attention Focused/local Global
Temporal focus Immediate, momentary, urgent, delay discounting Prospection/extended
Emotional intensity High Low
IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; AI, anterior insula; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 429 | 3
Tops et al. Internally directed cognition
scenarios as “context models” (cf. Tucker and Luu, 2007) or “inter-
nal (working) models.” Typically, DMN’s functioning has been
described to contain elements of autobiographical episodic mem-
ory and self-related prospective thoughts. Also, researchers have
suggested that continuously ongoing internally directed processes
through the DMN function as “simulator” and/or predictor of
future events, building upon previous experiences, using past
experiences and internal working models to plan for the future
(Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Tucker and Luu, 2007; Tops et al.,
2010; Smallwood et al., 2013a). One could summarize these three
points by stating that theDMN’smain function is that of predictive
control.
This concept of the internal model – which truly is the basis
for our idea of predictive control – originates in the work of the
philosopher Kenneth Craik. Craik (1943) noted the adaptiveness
of the ability of thought to plan for future events. He stressed
the survival value of and natural selection for the ability to plan
for future events. According to Craik, prediction occurs when a
“small-scale model” consisting of brain events is used to repre-
sent not only the external environment, but also the individual’s
own possible actions. Internal models thus allow people to men-
tally experiment with alternative realities, using past knowledge
to respond to the present and future. One of the most notable
examples to apply Craik’s ideas to social relationships and attach-
ment was of course attachment theorist John Bowlby (Bowlby,
1988), who was followed up more recently by other psycholo-
gists applying the concept of the mental model to perception,
cognition, personality, and therapy (Kelly, 1955; Piaget, 1960;
Johnson-Laird, 1983; Clark, 2013a,b; Hirsh et al., 2013; Hassabis
et al., 2013).
The predictive system as we have described it in PARCS largely
overlaps with a recent incarnation of these internal models,
focused on a “situation model,” an internal model, that repre-
sents relationships between entities, motivations, actions, and
outcomes (Ranganath and Ritchey, 2012). Speciﬁcally, a situa-
tion model is like a schema that speciﬁes the gist of the spatial,
temporal and causal relationships that apply within a particular
context, and relies on the same neural correlates of the dorsal pre-
dictive system. Behavioral research suggests that situation models
support a diverse range of cognitive functions that are relevant
for planning for future events, such as language comprehension,
inductive reasoning, decision making, learning of cause–effect
relationships, and a more general social cognition (Zwaan and
Radvansky, 1998).
Consistent with a role for the DMN to simulate and pre-
dict, the default and the dorsal executive network can closely
cooperate in supporting thought processes, and seem to do so
at times when primary sensory cortices discontinue the pro-
cessing of external perceptual information. For example, while
viewing videos, cortical activity momentarily decreased dur-
ing eye blinks in the dorsal executive network but increases in
the DMN (Nakano et al., 2013). When the video was removed
from the screen, there were no reciprocal changes in brain net-
works, suggesting that increased activity in the DMN during
eye blinks reﬂects internal processing. In line with the predictive
role of the DMN, activation of this network was associated with
faster actions when actions required input from memory but
did not depend upon immediate perceptual input, but activa-
tion of this network was associated with slower actions when
they were based on perceptual input (Smallwood et al., 2013b).
In their work, Christoff et al. (2009) ﬁnd converging support
that mind wandering – which is based on internally directed
cognition – engaged both the DMN and DLPFC. When par-
ticipants were engaging in mind wandering, they displayed
positive functional connectivity between these regions and neg-
ative functional connectivity between the DMN and primary
sensory cortices (Christoff, 2012). In this work, this was inter-
preted as reﬂecting involvement of mind wandering in simulation
and prediction in action control. Aligning with the idea that
mind wandering is for planning for future events, goal-directed
simulation engaged the DMN and the DLPFC (Gerlach et al.,
2011).
Whereas we have nowdiscussed the role of theDMN in internal
models and mind wandering, there is also clear support for the
role of the DMN in social functioning. Indeed, areas of the DMN
(precuneus and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (PFC)], together
with the IFG, are also activated while observing social interactions
(Iacoboni et al., 2004) and with increased social working memory
load (Meyer et al., 2012). This latter activation we interpret to
reﬂect the recruitment of internal models of normative principles
for social relations (cf. Rai and Fiske, 2011). In other words, the
DMN is not only activated when there is no externally focused task
to perform, but more broadly is implicated when internal models
are attended to. Based on these converging lines of research, we
tentatively conclude that the DMN plays a major part in the dorsal
predictive control system.
THE ANTERIOR INSULA AS PART OF THE REACTIVE SYSTEM
For this section, we select the AI to discuss characteristics of
reactive control. The AI is not only an important area of the
reactive control system, but like the DMN, it has also been impli-
cated in awareness (Craig, 2009). Beyond that we set the stage for
interpreting the AI in terms of PARCS in relation to earlier inter-
pretations, discussing the role of the AI and relating this to the
role of the DMN in PARCS will help us to contrast and typify
reactive and predictive control effects on awareness and inter-
nally directed cognition in Section“The Dynamics of Reactive and
Predictive Control Systems in Internally Directed Cognition and
Mindfulness.”
In PARCS, the AI is not only a central hub for the reactive
system, but also for shifts between reactive and predictive con-
trol. Especially the right hemisphere AI and IFG are implicated
in the coordination of responses in situations of emergency, nov-
elty, and unpredictability. In unpredictable or novel environments
and situations, there are no relevant or effective predictive internal
models available. Instead, the reactive system initiates feedback-
guided control of behavior. This system controls responding to
novel, salient and urgent stimuli and focuses attention on stimuli
that are urgent and close in time and space.
Functional and connectional gradients in brain areas includ-
ing the insula point to the importance of discriminating reactive
(ventral) from predictive (dorsal) controls in the brain. Prevail-
ing theories hold that, especially in the right hemisphere, the
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insula is functionally organized along its caudal–dorsal to rostral–
ventral axis, with posterior regions showing more differentiation
between interoceptive information of different origins and ante-
rior regions forming integrated representations and awareness
of global interoceptive and emotional state and stimulus signif-
icance (e.g., Craig, 2009). Recently, support has accumulated that
the anterior-ventral insular regions are associated with areas that
form the ventral, reactive control system in PARCS. In terms
of function the AI forms part of a key emotional appraisal,
intensity of social-emotional experience or arousal, and cogni-
tive control network. By contrast, the dorsal posterior insula and
dorsal-middle insular regions have been associated with areas that
form the dorsal, predictive control system in PARCS, and are
activated during functions of predictive control such as sensori-
motor integration, skeletomotor body orientation, interoception,
and awareness. This support was obtained from meta-analyses
(Kurth et al., 2010; Cauda et al., 2012), studies of somatotopic
anatomic connections (e.g., Chikama et al., 1997), task-related
(e.g., Cauda et al., 2012) and resting state functional connectivity
(e.g., Postuma and Dagher, 2006; Taylor et al., 2009; Touroutoglou
et al., 2012), and probabilistic tractography (e.g., Cerliani et al.,
2012).
Predictive and reactive control systemsputs the functional, con-
nectional, and cytoarchitectonically gradients in the insula in a
different light, by functionally implicating them in shifts between
reactive and predictive control. The rostral-to-caudal functional
gradient appears to be similar to, and interconnected with, a
rostral-to-caudal functional gradient from the AI through mPFC
and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) to the PCC (see Tops
and Boksem, 2012). The rostral–ventral to caudal–dorsal gradi-
ent in mPFC displays a functional shift from responding to novel
events that trigger “manual” (i.e., momentary feedback guided)
control and learning, via feedforward control learning to action
selection aspects of more automated action control. This gradi-
ent mirrors the pattern of interconnections between cortex and
striatum, as IFG/AI and rostral–ventral mPFC are connected to
ventral striatum and PCC/precuneus are connected with dorsal
striatum. Reentrant loops through the ventral striatum terminate
in regions of PFC that are more dorsal than where they begin,
forming ventral (limbic), central (associative), and dorsal (motor)
corticostriatal loops through which information can pass from
ventral striatum forward into dorsal striatum, and this shift from
ventral to dorsal striatum is associated with a shift from hedo-
nic processing toward automated, non-hedonic habitual action
control (Alcaro and Panksepp, 2011). In terms of PARCS, this
shift in processing reﬂects performance learning through the for-
mation of internal models that allow for increased predictive
control.
As a central area of the reactive control system, the AI has been
implicated in homeostatic regulation (and in sympathetic nervous
system activation and interoception; Craig, 2005). Indeed, situa-
tions of unpredictability, uncontrollability, and emergency have
important consequences for homeostatic control. Consistent with
reactive control, right AI activation is associated with high arousal
in response to stimuli of the moment or stimuli that are expected
at any moment. PARCS suggests that anxious anticipation involves
the feeling that one should stay ready in reactive control mode to
handle imminent unpredictable or uncontrollable stimuli. Indeed,
anxious anticipation has been found to activate the right AI, and
more so in trait anxious individuals (Waugh et al., 2008; Lovero
et al., 2009; Carlson et al., 2011; Simmons et al., 2011). This may
explain why individuals with anxiety disorders exhibit elevated
right AI activity (Etkin and Wager, 2007).
By relating the differentiated viscerosensory representations
in the posterior insula to the predictive control system, PARCS
suggests that activation of these areas relate to increased inte-
roceptive self-observation skills (e.g., during mindfulness, see
Mindfulness). By contrast, PARCS predicts that urgency, emer-
gency, and unpredictability activate reactive control and the AI
and suppress predictive control (see Figure 1). In contrast with
Craig’s (2009) thoughts on the role of the AI, we note the asso-
ciation of reactive control with anxiety to explain why anxiety is
associated with increased undifferentiated awareness of arousal
(physiological activation; Pollatos et al., 2007) but less differenti-
ated awareness of speciﬁc somatic states (somatic neglect; Koole
et al., 2014).
APPRAISAL AND REAPPRAISAL IN THE RIGHT AND LEFT INFERIOR
FRONTAL GYRUS
In this section, we discuss functional hemispheric asymmetry in
the IFG, an area that partially borders to and often coactivates
with the AI, and constitutes another sub-area of the reactive con-
trol system. We do so to understand processes of appraisal and
reappraisal, which attempt to relate novel information and incon-
sistencies to internal models. After a short description of the role
of the right IFG, we will speciﬁcally focus on a translational func-
tion of the left IFG between reactive and predictive control (i.e.,
the process of assimilation of novel information to preexisting
internal models). This function of networks involving the left IFG
produces a third quality of experience and awareness that can be
discriminated from awareness produced by networks centered on
the DMN or right AI/IFG. In Section “The Dynamics of Reactive
and Predictive Control Systems in Internally Directed Cognition
and Mindfulness,” we discuss how these three different qualities
FIGURE 1 |The caudal–dorsal to rostral–ventral functional and
connectivity gradient in the insula. PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; IFG,
inferior frontal gyrus.
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of awareness can be discriminated subjectively and in research on
internally directed cognition and mindfulness.
Unexpected stimuli, like novelty and saliency, activate parallel
reactive and predictive system networks, the ﬁrst for appraising
the signiﬁcance of a stimulus, associated with phasic changes
in autonomic arousal and preferential recruitment of the right
hemisphere amygdala and IFG, and the second for evaluat-
ing and updating the stimulus context, which is not reliant
on orienting and involves the temporoparietal junction (supra-
marginal gyrus) and DLPFC in interaction with the hippocam-
pal/parahippocampal region (Williams et al., 2007). Especially in
the right hemisphere, nearby or overlapping areas in the IFG
are often coactive and implicated in the different aspects that
constitute the ﬁrst response to novelty and saliency, that is, the ori-
enting response (e.g., Downar et al., 2000). The classic orienting
response described by Maltzman and Raskin (1965) and Sokolov
(1960, 1963) has been thought to be made up of three subcom-
ponents: motoric or response (behavior) inhibition, bottom-up
orienting of attention and attentional capture by novelty, and
appraisal including elaborative processing of degraded or percep-
tually ambiguous stimuli. The right IFG is implicated in these
components of the orienting response (see, e.g., Aron et al.,
2004; Chikazoe et al., 2007; Shulman et al., 2009; Aron, 2011;
Tops and Boksem, 2011a) and other aspects of feedback-guided
reactive control and appears to coordinate appraisal of novelty,
emotional stimuli, and saliency. Indeed, the IFG/AI responds to
negative performance feedback, a stimulus that elicits typical ori-
enting responses such as decreased heart rate (Ullsperger and von
Cramon, 2003).
Signals of unpredictability, prediction and performance error,
novelty, incongruity, or saliency require individuals to appraise the
situation, and signal a need for return from model-guided feedfor-
ward control to momentary feedback-guided control (Figure 2;
Tops and Boksem, 2011b, 2012). Some of those signals may be
detected in the IFG/AI that subsequently interrupts predictive con-
trol (cf. Tucker et al.,2003; Corbetta et al.,2008;MenonandUddin,
2010). Brieﬂy observed signals may be processed further through
a maintenance working memory function of the IFG (Ranganath
et al., 2004; Tops and Boksem, 2011a). If this is followed by
reestablishment of predictive motor control by the dorsal ACC,
the arousal of the orienting response is allowed to return to base-
line. However, besides this process at the level of task performance,
habituation of orienting responses to novel, salient, and emotional
stimuli often requires reappraising the meaning and relevance of
the stimulus in relation to higher-level (i.e., self-related) internal
models.
One of the ways that allows people to reappraise novel and
emotional situations is through their social networks. Culture
and social sharing may be important inﬂuences that shape or
maintain internal models through personal narrative represen-
tations (Rimé, 2009; Hirsh et al., 2013). According to a review by
Rimé (2009), emotional experiences may occur when prediction
fails, when expectations are disconﬁrmed, and when activities in
progress are blocked. They challenge internal models about one-
self and the world that are held by individuals to preserve a sense
of coherence, predictability, and control. In addition, emotional
circumstances generally involve unfamiliar or atypical objects or
events that are likely to challenge collective representations and
shared knowledge. Given the right conditions under which it
occurs, verbal social sharing of emotions and conversation can
transform and absorb unfamiliar elements into social internal
models and facilitate reappraisal (Rimé, 2009).
The left hemisphere IFG is important in the process of assim-
ilation of novel and emotional information into existing internal
models and thereby has an important role in processes in PARCS.
Whereas the right IFG is implicated in the appraisal of a stimu-
lus, the left IFG is implicated in the reappraisal of the stimulus
in light of preexisting internal models. Reappraisal can alter
emotional responses by changing one’s interpretation of a situ-
ation’s meaning. The role of left and right IFG is similar to a
large extent; they are involved in appraisal and elaborative pro-
cessing when more automatic processing of predictive control
FIGURE 2 |The functions of left and right IFG are both similar and
different.They take over control and perform scrutiny when there is failure or
distraction from feedforward action control (right IFG) or when stimuli are not
immediately consistent with context or internal models (left IFG). DMN,
default mode network; AI, anterior insula; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; dACC,
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
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cannot do the job. However, the left IFG has an important inter-
mediate, translational function between reactive and predictive
control systems. The verbalization and semantization functions
in the left IFG may have a role in reappraisal processes and
verbal sharing of emotions as it helps translating and adapting
novel (relatively context-free) reactive emotional experiences into
semantic information that can be ﬁtted into internal models (see
Figure 2).
Functional neuroimaging has revealed that using reappraisal
strategies such as reinterpretation of the event in the service of
regulating affective responses to emotional stimulimost often acti-
vates the left IFG, while strategies to decrease or inhibit appraisal
most often activate the right IFG (see Ochsner et al., 2012 for
a review). Ochsner et al. (2012) have suggested that this pat-
tern could reﬂect the differential dependence of reappraisal on
linguistic and semantic processes as opposed to attentional pro-
cesses that generally show a left vs. right hemisphere pattern
of relative specialization. Indeed, similar to reappraisal, simply
emotion labeling (identifying, naming, and linguistic process-
ing of emotions) activates the left (and right) IFG and decreases
arousal and amygdala activity (Torrisi et al., 2013; see Mindful-
ness). Reappraisal is associated with enhanced memory while
emotion suppression is associated with impaired explicit mem-
ory of the emotional event; imaging results showed that successful
encoding during reappraisal was uniquely associated with greater
co-activationof the left IFG,amygdala, andhippocampus, suggest-
ing a possible role for elaborative encoding of negative memories
(Hayes et al., 2010). Relatedly, left IFG activation in anticipation of
uncontrollable pain related to less avoidance of ﬁtting into inter-
nal models, like trait denial coping (e.g., “I pretend that it hasn’t
really happened”), and greater attempts at ﬁtting into internal
models, like more acceptant coping (e.g., “I learn to live with it”;
e.g., Salomons et al., 2007).
Lesion studies support a link of right hemisphere function with
cognitive novelty and exploratory behavior, whereas the left hemi-
sphere has been linked to cognitive familiarity and routinization
(Goldberg et al., 1994). Based on research on split-brain patients,
a left brain interpreter refers to the construction of explanations
(in terms of internal models) by the left brain in order to make
sense of the world by reconciling novel information with what
was known before (Gazzaniga, 2000). The left brain interpreter
attempts to rationalize, reason, reappraise, and generalize new
information it receives in order to relate the present to inter-
nal models formed by the past. Similarly, a right hemisphere
appraisal-like mechanism for anomaly or novelty detection has
been proposed, vs. a left brain mechanism for maintaining current
beliefs (internal models) about the world (Ramachandran, 1995).
This may be related to neurophysiological evidence that the left
(socially manipulative, action oriented) and the right (emotional
perceptions) hemispheres subserve different emotional sets that
correspond to “control” and “appraisal” (Henry, 1997). Finally,
according to a model by Perlovsky (2011; Perlovsky and Ilin, 2013)
the language semantic area in the left IFG guides the development
of internal models using narrative information and restrictions
on Bayesian processes from culture and collective wisdom that
have accumulated in language (cf. Lupyan, 2012; Hirsh et al.,
2013).
Resting state functional connectivity in humans between cor-
tical areas and the striatum is consistent with such a central role
of the left IFG in the spiraling corticostriatal loops that connect
ventral (reactive) with dorsal (predictive) system areas (Di Mar-
tino et al., 2008; see The Anterior Insula as Part of the Reactive
System). Functional connectivity displayed a gradual transition,
in which the ventral striatum was connected to the right IFG (BA
47), the ventral caudatewas connected to the bilateral IFG,DLPFC,
and ventral ACC, all more extensively in the left compared to right
hemisphere. By contrast, the dorsal caudate nucleuswas connected
to the left IFG (BA 47/45) as well as to the bilateral dorsolateral
and dorsomedial PFC and PCC.
The translational role of the left IFG and its language semantic
area between reactive and predictive control systems is supported
by the tendency of this area in particular to coactivate with
both systems and in association with both reactive and predic-
tive control functions. Indeed, in addition to the more obvious
frequent coactivations of left and right IFG/AI, a meta-analysis of
DMN activation using the activation likelihood estimation (ALE)
approach across the domains resting state “default mode,” autobi-
ographical memory, prospection, navigation, and theory of mind,
found coactivation of the left IFG (strongest convergence in BA47)
with the DMN (Spreng et al., 2009). Similar results were found in
an ALE analysis by Mar (2011)1.
There are more speciﬁc examples of coactivation of the left
IFG with both reactive and predictive systems and control func-
tions. For instance, whereas emotion-introspection activated areas
including the right AI and left IFG, and cognitive self-reﬂection
(implicating internalmodels) activated left IFG/AI andDMNareas
such as the PCC, only the left IFG (BA 44,45,47) and mPFC were
activated in both conditions (Herwig et al., 2010). Similarly, the
feeling of familiarity elicited by stimuli of different modalities
and referring to the participants’ life experience was associated
with activation of the left hemisphere, speciﬁcally in the IFG (BA
47) and DMN areas including the precuneus, the angular gyrus,
the parahippocampal gyrus, and the hippocampus (Plailly et al.,
2007). By contrast, the feeling of unfamiliarity was related to a
smaller activation pattern mainly located in the right AI and likely
related to the detection of novelty.
SUMMARY
It is important to distinguish betweenmental controls for handling
novelty and unpredictable circumstances (i.e., reactive control)
and mental controls for handling familiar and predictable circum-
stances (predictive control), both in brain function and behavior.
While areas including the IFG andAI are examples of a larger reac-
tive control system, the DMN, together with the dorsal executive
system, are part of a larger predictive control system in PARCS
theory. The right IFG is involved in appraisal and detects stimuli
that require elaboration or scrutiny from reactive control. The left
1We offer the hypothesis that the activation of the left IFG during resting state may
be related to the relative left-frontal activation (as indicated by lower EEG alpha
power) that is often observed during resting state. This left frontal activation has
been associated with individual differences in approach motivation (e.g., Davidson,
1998), which may reﬂect predictive/feedforward action control. Indeed, the left
frontal EEG activation has been hypothesized to reﬂect activation of mechanisms
of reappraisal that facilitate approach (Harmon-Jones, 2004).
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IFG takes control during reappraisal when elaboration or scrutiny
is needed to ensure consistency of new information with internal
models.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER THEORIES
Because of the fundamental nature of PARCS in the brain, PARCS
bears relations to other theories from disparate areas. In focusing
on the DMN as part of the predictive control system, we discussed
relations with theories of DMN function (see The Default Mode
Network as Part of The Predictive System). Focusing on the AI as
part of the reactive control system, we derived an interpretation
of insula function and structure from PARCS that seems largely
compatible with Craig’s (2009) theory. However, instead of focus-
ing on the role of the AI in a type of awareness and dismissing
the less integrated or more differentiated posterior insula as rep-
resenting a lower-level processing stage, PARCS suggests a role of
the posterior insula in different types (differentiated vs. undif-
ferentiated) of awareness (see The Anterior Insula as Part of the
Reactive System), and differential relations with anxiety. These
theories are integrated with empirical support and with theories
of continuous functional and connectivity gradients in the brain
and how activity along those gradients can shift in functionally
meaningful ways via corticostriatal loops. We have also integrated
theories of hemispheric functional asymmetry based on cognitive,
lesion, and split-brain research, pointing to the left IFG as provid-
ing elaboration when necessary in the communication between
reactive and predictive processing (see Appraisal and Reappraisal
in the Right and Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus). We also discussed
similarities with Ranganath and Ritchey’s (2012; see The Anterior
Insula as Part of the Reactive System) memory model. One of
PARCS’ strength is that it binds together these previous theories
(and/or the phenomena they explain) in a meaningful way.
At this stage it is also prudent to explain some of our ter-
minologies, in particular in terms of contrasting PARCS and
the dual mechanisms of control (DMC) framework by Braver
and colleagues (see Braver, 2012). This is important, as we
initially used the same labels of “reactive control” and “proac-
tive control” that Braver (2012) used. Potential confusion that
may arise in relation to their model was the reason why more
recently we switched to using the labels reactive and predictive
control. Moreover, earlier we have mentioned (Tops and Bok-
sem, 2011a) that most of the control that is called proactive
control in their DMC framework actually is part of reactive
control in PARCS (the kind of tasks employed in their stud-
ies typically do not involve predictive control). For instance,
their proactive control reﬂects the active maintenance of task
goals associated with sustained and/or anticipatory activation of
lateral PFC, which does not need to involve predictive or feed-
forward action models but merely the maintenance of working
memory in the IFG, classifying as reactive control in PARCS
theory. Moreover, as we will further explicate below, control
by the reactive system is also not purely reactive in the sense
that it includes tasks like anticipatory vigilance and associative
short-term prediction. This latter idea explains why both DMC’s
reactive and proactive control are mediated by comparable (often
reactive/ventral system) brain areas, but predictive control in
PARCS is not.
Other theories that deserve discussion of their comparisonwith
PARCS are the one by Tucker and colleagues (Tucker et al., 1995,
2003; Tucker and Luu, 2007) that provided the basic departure
point for PARCS, and that by Menon and Uddin (2010) and Cor-
betta et al. (2008) that describe dorsal and ventral cortical systems
and shifts between them. However, those theories focus on atten-
tion and cognitive task performance and do not include functions
in motivation and emotion [with the notable exception of Tucker
and colleagues (e.g., Tucker et al., 1995, 2003)], have no func-
tional interpretation for hemispheric asymmetry or the role of left
ventrolateral cortical areas, and are mostly silent regarding dif-
ferent types of awareness and internally directed cognition. For
this reason, detailed comparisons with those theories would be
out of place in the present paper and are reserved for future
discussions focusing on consequences of PARCS for externally
directed cognition during cognitive response tasks. An impor-
tant advantage of PARCS theory is that it provides predictions,
interpretations, explanations, and organizing structure in areas
outside cognitive task control, such as in the areas of personality
and psychopathology (Tops et al., 2010), attachment theory, oxy-
tocin function, and addiction (Tops et al., 2014a), effort, stress,
and cortisol regulation (Tops et al., 2013c, 2014b) and internally
directed cognition.
We will limit ourselves here to just one, global-level compari-
son. Cognitive control theories tend to focus on the functions of
the dorsal ACC (i.e., anterior midcingulate cortex) and/or mPFC,
and when areas such as IFG or AI are addressed, they typically
are not implicated in equally important control functions (e.g.,
Botvinick et al., 2004; Shackman et al., 2011). In PARCS theory,
the right IFG is a cognitive control area of the reactive control
system that responds to novelty and salient stimuli, but is also
implicated in, for example, maintaining stimuli in a working
memory buffer for sustained processing (i.e., sustained appraisal),
and in sustained attention. Sustained attention can be very useful
in unpredictable circumstances and does not involve predictive
models, and is implicated in anticipatory anxiety. Neuroimaging
evidence supports the implication of the right IFG in effortful sus-
tained attention that prevents lapses and mind wandering. Several
studies have suggested that increased attentional effort during per-
formance over extended periods of time or after sleep deprivation
is associated with increased activation of right-hemisphere ventral
cortical areas including IFG/AI, and sometimes in the context of
activity declines in dorsal ACC and/or DLPFC (for a review, see
Tops et al., 2013c). Moreover, the compensatory recruitment of
the right IFG/AI after lapses of attention (i.e., mind wandering) is
associated with recovery from lapses in attention (Weissman et al.,
2006).
Notably, the predictive processing framework, that applies to
the predictive control system and internal models in PARCS, has
generated considerable interest in recent years (Clark, 2013a,b;
Seligman et al., 2013). According to Clark (2013a), the brain as an
action-oriented prediction machine provides a unifying frame-
work for perception, action, and cognition (and homeostatic
control, we would add). However, Clark himself points out that
the predictive processing framework fails to specify the overall
form of a cognitive architecture. It fails to specify speciﬁc neu-
ral mechanisms that are employed in speciﬁc circumstances and
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how they are arranged to explain complex behavior (Rasmussen
and Eliasmith, 2013). Moreover, it fails to specify mechanisms that
are employed in unpredictable or novel circumstances. We do not
pretend that PARCS in its present form provides answers to all
relevant questions. Rather, we regard PARCS theory in its present
form as a starting point, readily providing relative comprehensive-
ness and detail as a theory of human behavior and cognition as
compared to related theories.
THE DYNAMICS OF REACTIVE AND PREDICTIVE CONTROL
SYSTEMS IN INTERNALLY DIRECTED COGNITION AND
MINDFULNESS
In this section, we apply PARCS theory to explain aspects of
internally directed cognition including self-awareness, mind wan-
dering, rumination, mental imagery, autobiographical memory,
andmindfulness. Speciﬁcally, Clark (2013a) suggested that predic-
tive systems, building from their function to facilitate perception
by providing prediction and context, develop the ability to self-
generate mental imagery by driving perceptual areas in predicted
patterns. Additionally, mental imagery may partly implicate
similar brain networks as autobiographical memory. Daselaar
et al. (2010) proposed that the DMN represents the core of the
modality-independent imagery network. As discussed in Section
“The Default Mode Network as Part of the Predictive System,”The
DMN has been proposed to support an ability to perform inter-
nal mentation (Buckner and Carroll, 2007). However, DMN and
IFG activation correlated with vividness of imagery, suggesting
recruitment of reactive control areas as well (Zvyagintsev et al.,
2013). For internally directed cognitions, both the reactive and
predictive systems are thus likely to be recruited, and, as suggested
by PARCS, such introspection may well form the basis of abstract
cogitation related to concrete and contextualized experiences (cf.
Barsalou, 2008).
The same processes may be activated during the reading of
stories, which activates internal models of world knowledge and
self-narratives, as well as mental imagery. Relating new experi-
ences from a narrative to the self may implicate left IFG functions
in searching, retrieving, and integrating world knowledge into
linguistic representations and detecting world knowledge anoma-
lies (Kuperberg et al., 2003; Hagoort et al., 2004). During story
comprehension this area coactivates with the DMN implicated in
self-related processing and mentalizing (Mar, 2011), producing a
pattern of activation that is similar to other examples (given in
Section “Appraisal and Reappraisal in the Right and Left Inferior
Frontal Gyrus”) where new information had to be integrated with
internal models.
We can imagine looking at ourselves (third person, observer
perspective) or looking through our own eyes (ﬁrst person, ﬁeld
perspective). Internally directed cognition and self-reﬂection can
involve different spatial (e.g., ﬁeld vs. observer) and temporal
(e.g., momentary vs. retrospective vs. prospective) perspectives
and different attentional modes (e.g., a mindfulness mode).
Mind wandering typically involves imagery, episodic memory,
and other self-reﬂective capacities that can vary in perspec-
tive and attentional mode. Characteristics such as perspective
may help us understand which mechanisms are responsible for
mental experience at any given moment. In the section that
follows, we now discuss how PARCS can aid in understanding
different forms of awareness and self-reference and in applying
different spatial perspectives in internally directed cognition and
mindfulness.
THE RUMINATING AND THE WANDERING MIND
Mind wandering has been thought of as the engagement in cogni-
tion unrelated to the current demands of the external environment
(Schooler et al., 2011). As such, the term mind wandering may
not refer to a speciﬁc kind of internally directed cognition but
instead may involve different kinds including reﬂection and self-
awareness. Notably, research on individual differences in internally
directed mental states such as self-consciousness suggests that two
states can be discriminated that are in some regards very different
but are nevertheless positively correlated and easily confounded:
rumination and reﬂection (Trapnell and Campbell, 1999). They
are different in their correlations with third variables, reﬂection
being associated with more accurate and extensive self-knowledge
and lower psychological distress whereas rumination is associ-
ated with higher psychological distress, social anxiety, depression,
obsessive thinking, external control, self-discrepancy, and other-
directedness (Watson et al., 1996; Trapnell and Campbell, 1999;
Ben-Artzi and Hamburger, 2001–2002; Ghorbani et al., 2004;
Takano and Tanno, 2009). We discussed the role of the DMN and
predictive control in prospective reﬂection in Section“TheDefault
Mode Network as Part of The Predictive System.” In Section “The
Ruminating Mind,”we build on the role of the left IFG/AI in inte-
gratingnovel informationwith internalmodels, to explain the role,
mechanism and place of rumination in PARCS. Next, in Section
“The Wandering Mind,” we show that the combination of mecha-
nisms of reﬂection and rumination allows PARCS to describe the
processes that take place during mind wandering.
Within PARCS, rumination reﬂects elaborative, often self-
related, processing of incongruency between incoming informa-
tion and internal models. Hence, PARCS predicts coactivation
and/or functional connectivity between left IFG/AI and DMN
areas involved in processing related to the self and internal
models (see The Ruminating Mind). Mind wandering not only
sometimes reﬂects rumination, but also, at other times, prospec-
tive reﬂection. Whereas during rumination, mind wandering
is often concerned with problematic happenings from the past,
social-evaluative concerns and negative affect, during reﬂection
it is associated with prediction of successful actions and with
positive affect. Prospective reﬂection involves predictive control
system areas (e.g., DMN) without left IFG/AI involvement. Mind
wandering does not involve and is negatively related to right hemi-
sphere reactive control (see Comparison with Other Theories;
except the speciﬁc case of sustained appraisal of salient stimuli
if this is regarded mind wandering) and dorsal executive system
activation.
The ruminating mind
Based on PARCS, we have now tried to clarify how the left IFG
is important in the process of assimilation of novel and emo-
tional information into existing internal models. Speciﬁcally, in
Section “Appraisal and Reappraisal in the Right and Left Infe-
rior Frontal Gyrus,” we have discussed how the left IFG reactive
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control is involved in reappraisal and elaborative processing when
more automatic processing of predictive control cannot do the
job. This elaborative processing may turn into rumination in the
form of prolonged and repeated contemplation of problematic
information, self-contemplation, and self-examination.
Certain people, especially those suffering from social anxiety
and social evaluative concerns, even apply a distinctive type of
rumination, involving reappraisal, but in the “wrong” direction:
instead of making information acceptable for inclusion in inter-
nal models, by contrasting information with internal models of
what is acceptable to others, the impact of social signals is inten-
siﬁed as part of a strategy to prevent rejection (Mikulincer and
Shaver, 2007). This type of rumination does not solve problems
but instead is related to prolonged and recurrent contemplation of
social concerns, and often to unfavorable consequences. Moreover,
the social concerns induce self-discrepancy, i.e., inconsistencies
between internal models, triggering ruminative self-processing
(Ben-Artzi and Hamburger, 2001–2002).
Consistent with overlapping functions in PARCS, the brain
mechanisms behind this self-reﬂective kind of rumination are
similar as those behind positive reappraisal and those behind an
adaptive (problem-solving) type of rumination – which we will
refer to as reﬂection from here on forward – because they involve
comparable cognitive functions for elaborative self-reﬂection in
the left IFG (for a review, see Trapnell and Campbell, 1999;
Andrews and Thomson, 2009). Speciﬁcally, whereas reﬂection
involves contextualization by activating internal models, anxious
anticipation (i.e., appraisal-related rumination) has been found
to activate the right AI, and more so in trait anxious individu-
als (Carlson et al., 2011; Simmons et al., 2011; see The Anterior
Insula as Part of the Reactive System). What is the key difference
for more chronic ruminative (vs. reﬂective) types of dealing with
novel information can be found by examining trait anxious indi-
viduals, for whom the right AI anticipatory activation showed
stronger connectivity to the left IFG and DMN areas includ-
ing the precuneus and PCC. The latter ﬁnding may reﬂect the
greater tendency of trait anxious individuals to engage in negative
self-directed attention (Simmons et al., 2011).
Predictive and reactive control system predicts that elabora-
tive self-reﬂection involves co-activation of the left IFG/AI with
DMN areas involved in self- and other-reﬂection, perspective tak-
ing, internal models, and memory (Modinos et al., 2009). In turn,
this means that a host of elaborative self-directed attention involve
activation of the left IFG/AI and the DMN, such as trait anxi-
ety, social anxiety, and self-focused rumination and depression.
Consistent with this prediction, trait rumination predicts activa-
tion of left IFG (BA 47) during both observing negative images
and when reappraising neutral images in a negative way, while in
the last case there tends to be coactivation of DMN areas impli-
cated in self-referential thought (Ray et al., 2005; cf. Engels et al.,
2007). Furthermore, social anxiety patients showed less DMN
deactivation during perception of neutral and emotional faces
than controls, suggesting that sustained activation of the DMN
reﬂected feeling of wariness of others’ judgment and self-focused
rumination (Gentili et al., 2009). Finally, self-focused rumination
in depression is also believed to involve persistent DMN activation
(Lemogne et al., 2012).
If both the left IFG/AI and the DMN are involved in negative
self-directed attention, then one would also expected increased
functional connectivity between these areas during times of anx-
iety and rumination. Indeed, while reappraisal often efﬁciently
resolves emotional issues, large incongruencies between novel
information and internal models or inconsistencies and conﬂicts
within or between models themselves may trigger self-reﬂective
rumination, in the form of elaborative processing from the left
IFG/AI that “hijacks” the DMN. Only recently the ﬁrst stud-
ies have been published of the functional connectivity of the
DMN or left IFG/AI during anxiety and rumination. These stud-
ies do suggest the hypothesized functional connectivity between
the left ventral control areas and the DMN. Severity in major
depression predicted functional connectivity between the left AI
and the pregenual ACC that is part of the DMN, which may
reﬂect increased self-related rumination (Horn et al., 2010). Sim-
ilar results have been obtained in healthy subjects. Self-reported
state anxiety during a resting-state scan related to increased con-
nectivity of the left AI to theDMN (Dennis et al., 2011). In another
study, after the end of a social stressor there was increased func-
tional connectivity of the amygdalae with the PCC (Veer et al.,
2010). Another study that separated AI activation during anx-
ious rumination from activation during interoception and focal
attention, found that whereas the last two activations lateralized
to the right mid- and AI, anxious rumination was lateralized
to the left AI (Simmons et al., 2013). Moreover, anxious rumi-
nation produced substantially more coactivation in DMN areas
(includingPCC,precuneus, left parahippocampal gyrus, andbilat-
eral hippocampus) and selective functional connectivity to left
(more than right) IFG, left (more than right) caudate, left pre-
cuneus and angular gyrus, and bilateral dorsomedial PFC and
DLPFC.
In summary, the ﬁndings appear to be consistent with involve-
ment in the ruminative process of co-activation of the left IFG/AI
with DMN areas. This reactive control from the let IFG/AI
hijacks areas that have access to internal models for elaborate
processing.
The wandering mind
We have now focused on internally directed cognitions, such as
rumination and reﬂection. Another important aspect of inter-
nally directed cognition is mind wandering. PARCS allows to
discriminate between two types of mindwandering that verymuch
run parallel to the modes of integrating novel information: (1) a
prospective and reﬂective type associated with predictive control,
related to planning, optimism, andDMNactivation; (2) a rumina-
tive type reﬂecting reactive control associated with a tendency to
negative affect, problem solving or self-reﬂection and coactivation
and/or functional connectivity between the left IFG and the DMN
(see The Ruminating Mind).
Consistent with predictive control during a prospective type
of mind wandering, recent research suggests that during mind
wandering, consciousness becomes decoupled from perception,
providing an opportunity to guide behavior using internally rep-
resented plans and goals, or internal models (Antrobus et al.,
1966; Baumeister and Masicampo, 2010; Baumeister et al., 2011;
Smallwood et al., 2013b). Reports of task-unrelated thoughts
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obtained during performance of non-demanding tasks support
the hypothesis that off-task thought can be a process that aids
preparation for future events: when thoughts are decoupled
from current tasks, occurring thoughts are often internally and
future-focused, taking the form of autobiographical planning
(Baird et al., 2011). Neuroimaging studies support this func-
tional interpretation by linking mind wandering to activation
of the DMN (and thus decoupling of conscious thought from
perception) that is believed to sub-serve functions of prospec-
tion, action planning, and simulation (see The Default Mode
Network as Part of The Predictive System). Individual tenden-
cies to mind wander away from the direct physical experience
from pain have also been associated with internally directed
DMN activation (Kucyi et al., 2013). These ﬁndings support
our ﬁrst suggested form of mind wandering, a prospective
and reﬂective type, related to planning, optimism, and DMN
activation.
Other ﬁndings are suggestive of reactive control during a more
ruminative type of mind wandering. Although mind wandering
typically involves future thinking to a signiﬁcant extent, unhappy
moods may lead to a retrospective bias in mind wandering
(Smallwood and O’Connor, 2011), possibly reﬂecting depres-
sive rumination aimed at trying to work out or solve things that
have gone wrong before future actions are planned and initiated
(Andrews and Thomson, 2009). Smallwood and Schooler (2006)
have suggested that mind wandering may be a mode of problem
solving. In particular, they suggested that mind wandering is a sit-
uation when controlled processing becomes hijacked in the service
of current concerns, much similar to ruminative ways of dealing
with current emotional states (see The Wandering Mind). If this
is correct, then this type of mind wandering includes elaborative
kinds of rumination processes that are associated with trying to
solve problems that have, so far, eluded solution. This interpreta-
tion in PARCSwould suggest the involvement of the left IFG in this
ruminative process (see The Ruminating Mind). Consistent with
this prediction, left IFG/AI coactivated together with DMN areas
prior to self-reports of mind wandering (Christoff et al., 2009) and
prior to self-reports of mind wandering or task-related interfer-
ence, which was suggested to reﬂect executive processes involved
in the management of personal goals and concerns (Stawarczyk
et al., 2011).
Consistentwith these two types of mindwandering, researchers
have detected links to both positive (Mar et al., 2012) and
negative emotion (Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010; Smallwood
and O’Connor, 2011). Smallwood et al. (2013b) explain the
heterogeneous array of correlates of mind wandering by sug-
gesting that experimental measures of task-unrelated thought
might actually be confounding different types of experience.
Although a small subset of fundamental processes may be com-
mon to all examples of task-unrelated thought (e.g., episodic
memory that generates the mental content, and the decou-
pling of attention from perception that supports internal focus),
there may well be psychological processes that discriminate
between mind wandering experiences with different qualities.
Smallwood et al. (2013b) suggest that mind wandering pro-
duces episodes that are productive (i.e., predictive) and other
episodes of a ruminative type that can be disruptive; some
might bring joy to the experiencer and others pain. PARCS pro-
vides the underlying mechanisms for different types of mind
wandering and embedding them into a context of emotional
control.
THE SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVES OF REACTIVE AND
PREDICTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS
Predictive and reactive control system suggests ways in which
predictive, reactive, and ruminative control are associated with
different subjective qualities of awareness. Those differences can
be experienced at different times during mind wandering, but
also during introspection, imagery, and autobiographical recall.
In this section, we not only discuss whether PARCS can explain
phenomenology that is described in research on self-awareness,
imagery, and autobiographical memory, but also discuss aspects
of the control modes that are addressed in this literature and that
can help discriminate the different control modes as they alternate
over time during mind wandering or mindfulness training (see
The Anterior Insula as Part of the Reactive System).
In (self-)awareness, it may be difﬁcult to subjectively discrimi-
nate ruminative from predictive control types because elaboration
or contemplation on awareness makes it the object of left reac-
tive control (related to rumination). Moreover, both types of
control have access to internal models, which renders them rel-
atively contextualized and detached. Indeed, in Section “The
Wandering Mind,” we discriminated ruminative and prospec-
tive mind wandering purely on the basis of different (and
sometimes even opposite) correlates. Given low subjective dis-
crimination between ruminative and predictive control types,
PARCS suggests that descriptions of self-awareness contrast the
right hemisphere reactive control type (characterized by vivid
experience of the here and now and arousability) from a type
that may reﬂect ruminative or predictive control (including char-
acteristics such as self-reﬂective, contextualization and relative
detachment from the here and now and hence decreased arous-
ability; see The Reactive vs. the Predictive Self). Those two types of
self-awareness are further characterized by a ﬁeld vs. observer per-
spective, respectively2, that have similar correlates as the respective
types of self-awareness and that are recognized or manipu-
lated in studies of imagery and autobiographical memory (see
Field and Observer Perspective in Imagery and Autobiographical
Memory).
The reactive vs. the predictive self
In terms of the neural correlates of consciousness, PARCS inte-
grates and connects two competing theories. The DMN has
been suggested as a candidate for the network subserving basic
functions related to consciousness (Boly et al., 2008; Greicius
et al., 2008). Indeed, DMN connectivity is decreased in severely
brain-damaged patients, in proportion to their degree of con-
sciousness impairment (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010). However,
activity in this area is inversely correlated in functional-imaging
studies with the activation in the AI that is associated with
2At high arousal, increased narrowing of attentional focus may induce an object-
centered instead of ﬁrst person perspective (Easterbrook, 1959; Tucker, 2001).
However, we assume that this is not the typical experience in mental imagery and
autobiographical memory.
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awareness and task-related attention (Craig, 2009). Moreover,
the right hemisphere reactive orienting/appraisal system closely
corresponds to the set of cortical regions damaged in patients
with hemineglect syndromes in whom unpredicted sudden stim-
ulus changes do not enter awareness (see Downar et al., 2000).
This has led to competing theories of the neural substrates
of awareness, stressing either the role of the DMN in self-
awareness extending across time or the role of interoceptive
and emotional information integration in the AI in subjective
feeling and awareness of the emotional moment. By contrast,
PARCS seeks to integrate these different aspects or qualities
of awareness in one framework by relating them to predictive
(associated with internal models) and reactive control, respec-
tively.
Predictive and reactive control system predicts two fundamen-
tally different modes of self experience, the experiential (reactive)
mode of the right predictive system that is focused on context-free
momentary experience, and experience in the context of predictive
system internal models that include past, present and future. As we
have discussed, during self-elaboration, the left IFG may connect
aspects of the reactive mode to the predictive mode of cognition,
also implicating internal models. However, the processing modes
of the right reactive system and the controls involving internal
models appear to be two extremes that contrast most subjectively
striking with each other, which may be recognizable in different
modes of phenomenal awareness and the self. Descriptions in the
literature of different forms of awareness and self-reference appear
to match the description of the right reactive system control and
control involving internal models. Here, we will discuss how these
different control systems can be involved in different forms of
self-awareness and self-reference.
Many scholars have suggested that there are two facets of the self
– one deﬁned by experiential awareness and the other by concep-
tual knowledge (Damasio, 1994; Gallagher, 2000; LeDoux, 2002;
Wilson, 2002; Epstein, 2003). This corresponds with the experi-
ential (i.e., context-free, appraising) right reactive mode and the
internal model (predictive as well as the left reactive mode work-
ing with those models), respectively. James’ (1890/1950) notion of
the “I” (self as experiencer) vs. the “me” (self as object) is a well-
known example of this distinction. The experiential “I” self can be
understood as emerging in a bottom-up fashion, evoked by con-
crete momentary features of the environment and one’s actions on
it (right reactive mode). The conceptual “me” self reﬂects internal
models of the self as an abstract entity that spans across time (inter-
nal model mode). These internal models that guide the experience
of the self have been described in terms of diverse meaning struc-
tures including self-schemas (Markus, 1977), self-theories (Ross,
1989; Hong et al., 1999), and self-narratives (Singer and Salovey,
1993; Neisser, 1994; McAdams, 2001).
In a similar distinction showing an internal model mode
and a right reactive mode, extended self-reference links experi-
ences across time (internal model mode), whereas momentary
self-reference is centered on the present (right reactive mode;
Farb et al., 2007; Craig, 2009). It has been suggested that the
experiential “I” represents a more primitive awareness of self
that we may share with other animals, whereas the concep-
tual “me” is an elaborated version relying on uniquely human
capabilities for language and self-reﬂection (Damasio, 1994; Gal-
lagher, 2000; Farb et al., 2007). For example, Gallagher (2000)
proposed two important concepts of self: the “minimal self,” a
self devoid of temporal extension, and the “narrative self,” which
involves personal identity and continuity across time. Gallagher
relates the narrative self to Gazzaniga’s left-hemisphere “inter-
preter” and episodic memory (see Appraisal and Reappraisal in
the Right and Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus). The minimal self
may reﬂect a minimal form of self-consciousness, namely pre-
reﬂective self-consciousness, which was argued to be a constant
structural feature of conscious experience that corresponds to
the consciousness of the self-as-subject that is not taken as an
intentional object (i.e., right reactive experiential mode; Legrand,
2007).
It has been suggested that the two aspects of the self are sup-
ported by different neural systems (Gallagher, 2000; Northoff and
Bermpohl, 2004). For instance, emotional and interoceptive sig-
nal processing in the posterior insula has been related to bodily
self-consciousness and the “I” (Heydrich and Blanke, 2013; Park
and Tallon-Baudry, 2014). However, activation in the right AI,
ventromedial PFC and the precuneus are functionally associated
for accessing interoceptive information and underpinning subjec-
tive experience of the emotional state (Terasawa et al., 2013). Thus,
awareness of one’s own emotional state appears to involve the inte-
gration of interoceptive information with an interpretation of the
current situation derived from internal models (see Figure 2). In
the following section, we explore how the inﬂuences from reac-
tive and predictive control on self-processing and memory may
result in the adoption of different perspectives in imagery and
autobiographical memory.
Field and observer perspective in imagery and autobiographical
memory
Predictive and reactive control system integrates the implication of
the DMN in internally directed cognition and self-reﬂection with
a role for the left IFG in the case of (self-)rumination. Moreover,
the right reactive system is involved in an experiential, context-free
direct ﬁeld perspective of being in the world, while the left reactive
control is involved in rumination and problem solving, suggest-
ing a more observing perspective. By contrast, predictive control
is ﬂexible in terms of perspectives that can be of the self, other,
observer or ﬁeld (in this case the ﬁeld perspective may involve
coactivation or functional connectivity between the DMN and
executive parts of the predictive system). In terms of recall, peo-
ple can recollect an event as if they were seeing it again through
their own eyes (ﬁeld) or from the perspective of a detached spec-
tator (observer). We will discuss evidence that experience that is
experiential (e.g., focused on feelings and often reﬂecting the right
reactive mode) tends to adopt a ﬁeld perspective, while experi-
ence in an analytic or reappraising (left reactive) mode adopts an
observer perspective.
Consistent with the context-free right reactive mode, picturing
an event from the ﬁeld perspective involves a bottom-up style of
constructing meaning in which people incorporate information
about the experience evoked by concrete features of the pictured
situation and deﬁne the event in terms of these constituent aspects.
Consistent with the left reactive mode, picturing an event from the
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observer perspective involves a top-down style of meaning making
inwhich people integrate a pictured eventwithin a broader context
and deﬁne the event in terms of the abstract meaning that results
(Libby and Eibach, 2011). Individuals experimentally induced to
focus on their feelings about an experience are more likely to recall
the event from the ﬁeld perspective, whereas individuals induced
to focus on the objective circumstances of an experience are more
likely to recall the event from the observer perspective (Nigro and
Neisser, 1983).
Indicative of a decreased experiential mode (decreased
appraisal and right reactive control), memories naturally retrieved
from the observer perspective are related to less reliving, fewer
visual images, less sensory information, less urgency, and less
certainty that the event occurred as the individual remembers it
(Berntsen andRubin,2006). The distance providedby the observer
perspective may be a functional part of left reactive control that
allows the individual to more objectively observe the situation and
subsequently reappraise, work through, and ultimately leave an
emotional experience behind them. It may be easier to engage
in this process of reappraisal or rumination when individuals can
detach themselves from the direct painful or emotional experience
(Wilson and Ross, 2003). Rumination and emotional detach-
ment related to an observer perspective in depression (Williams
and Moulds, 2007). Shifting the recall of a distressing intrusive
memory of a negative autobiographical event by mildly dyspho-
ric participants from a ﬁeld to an observer perspective resulted
in decreased experiential ratings: speciﬁcally, reduced distress and
vividness (Williams andMoulds, 2008). Imagery of positive scripts
produced more positive affect after ﬁeld than observer imagery
(Holmes et al., 2008).
When individuals adopt a wider, contextualized (“global” or
“detached”) perspective, they activate predictive system areas. For
instance, subjects who were instructed to view neutral and aver-
sive social scenes as though they were an anthropologist viewing
the scene objectively or an emergency room doctor maintain-
ing a detached clinical perspective so that he can function coolly
in the situation, they activated typical predictive system (DMN)
areas such as the precuneus, PCC, middle temporal and angu-
lar gyrus and mPFC (Koenigsberg et al., 2010). Moreover, while
distancing from aversive scenes, they coactivated the left IFG/AI
(BA 47/45/13) together with the DMN areas and deactivated the
amygdala, consistent with an observer view during reappraisal or
rumination.
There are few more direct studies of ﬁeld and observer perspec-
tives. One study found signiﬁcant decreases in bilateral insula and
left somato-motor activity during the recall of observer memories,
suggesting reduction in one’s cortical representations of the phys-
ical, embodied self when an observer perspective is taken (Eich
et al., 2009). Additionally, there was a small relative increase in
right amygdala activity coincident with the recall of ﬁeld memo-
ries, providing limited support for right reactive system activation.
In another study analyzing two independent datasets, the sponta-
neous tendency to recall memories from a ﬁeld perspective was
positively correlated with the volume of the anterior part of the
right precuneus (Freton et al., 2014). Activation of the right pre-
cuneus suggests that this activation reﬂect the ﬁeld perspective that
can be adopted in the predictive control mode. Of note the right
IFG and precuneus coactivate during autobiographical recall or
imagery (e.g., Zvyagintsev et al., 2013), which may reﬂect context
from internal models supporting perception and recall in the right
reactive system (Figure 2).
Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that a ﬁeld perspective
may reﬂect the right hemisphere reactive (experiential) mode. By
contrast, making meaning of experience and integrating it with
a broader context during rumination and reappraisal (left reac-
tive) is performed from the observer perspective. By contrast,
predictive control can adopt either a ﬁeld or observer perspec-
tive. However, the sparse direct neuroimaging evidence is as yet
inconclusive.
MINDFULNESS
Although people have problems with subjectively discriminating
the ruminative reactive (observer perspective) from the predic-
tive control type of self-awareness, the predictive control type
should actually be ﬂexible in perspective taking, being able to
take the perspective of self, others, observer and the ﬁeld perspec-
tive. This ability of predictive control to take a ﬁeld perspective
that contrasts with the observer perspective of ruminative reactive
control enables people to discriminate and experience awareness
that purely relates to predictive control, through training tech-
niques such as mindfulness meditation. Mindfulness meditation
facilitates predictive system control of awareness by stimulating a
ﬁeld perspective through focusing on the here and now, preventing
rumination, sustained appraisal, habitual behavior, prospection,
and mind wandering. Despite this instrumental focus on the
here and now, PARCS predicts that this type of predictive con-
trol (mindful) awareness should be characterized by detached
observation, awareness of context, conscious access to the rich
features of each experience, an autobiographical sense of identity
that projects back into the past and forward into the future, and
enhanced metacognition and self-regulation skills (i.e., availability
of internal models).
Mindfulness meditation is increasingly included in therapies
and interventions to boost resilience. PARCS theory suggests that,
comparable to the cultivation of certain kinds of positive affect
and emotion regulation, mindfulness meditation may increase
resilience by inducing a shift from reactive control toward internal
model-guided control (Tops et al., 2013a).Wenowdiscusswhether
mindfulness features the characteristics of ﬁeld perspective pre-
dictive system control as predicted by PARCS theory: detached
observation, decreased appraisal, availability of internal models,
and focus on the here and now.
Detached observation and increased self-observation skills
The mindfulness approach promotes detached observation, which
presumably has the effect of increasing the individual’s capac-
ity to tolerate difﬁcult emotions. The accompanying exposure,
possibly by assimilation of the emotional material in internal
models, transforms such emotions into innocuous states (Kent
and Davis, 2010). Mindfulness practice may result in improved
self-observation skills, which may lead to better recognition
of sensations, cognitions, and emotional states and improved
ability to respond skillfully to these phenomena as they arise
(Baer et al., 2004). Such “internal state awareness” has been
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described as the reﬂective type of self-consciousness that con-
trasts with the ruminative type by showing negative instead of
positive correlations with social anxiety, depression, psycho-
logical distress, obsessive thinking, external control and other-
directedness, and more accurate and extensive self-knowledge
(Watson et al., 1996; Trapnell and Campbell, 1999; Ghorbani
et al., 2004; Takano and Tanno, 2009). Increased self-observation
skills may reﬂect the availability of predictive internal models
to guide perception (Figure 2) and, relatedly, access to dif-
ferentiated viscerosensory interoceptive representations in the
caudal–dorsal insula (see The Anterior Insula as Part of the
Reactive System). Indeed, in a recent study mindfulness medi-
tation practice compliance predicted greater posterior (caudal–
dorsal) insula and reduced visual pathway recruitment during
interoceptive attention to visceral bodily sensations (Farb et al.,
2012).
Demonstrating limitations to self-observation skills, people’s
beliefs about who they are do not always correspond with the
reactions that the environment evokes in them (cf. Nisbett and
Wilson, 1977). PARCS suggests that this may be the case because
effortful contemplation and rumination as directed by the left
IFG from the observer perspective often implicates concerns about
social rules and evaluation, and has no access to direct experience
from the ﬁeld perspective. Moreover, as discussed above, especially
the predictive control system’s mode of contextualized percep-
tion and awareness may be difﬁcult to contemplate. One way to
gage insight into experience is to assess the correspondence of
explicit reports with implicit measures. Mindfulness meditation
and instructions to focus on one’s gut reactions to stimuli have
both been shown to bring explicit attitudes in line with implicit
measures (Gawronski and LeBel, 2008; Koole et al., 2009). Both of
these manipulations share a conceptual similarity with the style of
meaning-making that occurs with ﬁeld perspective imagery, where
people focus on their responses to the imagined environment,
without judgment shaped by contemplation on their broader con-
cept of the self. Indeed, ﬁndings reviewed by Libby and Eibach
(2011) suggest that ﬁeld perspective imagery has an analogous
effect on the correspondence between explicit reports and implicit
measures.
As an exampleof improved self-observation skills,mindfulness-
based stress reduction therapy in social anxiety patients attenuated
maladaptive habitual self-views by facilitating recruitment of the
left IFG (BA 47) together with DMN areas in response to words
describing negative traits during a self-evaluation task (Goldin
et al., 2012). The implicit (uninstructed) nature of the task with
regard to emotion regulation or rumination and short inter-
stimulus intervals suggest that the change after mindfulness-based
stress reduction therapy, which related to reduced anxiety symp-
toms, reﬂected reappraisal of habitual self-views (Goldin et al.,
2012) which may have increased access to internal models and
more differentiated and optimistic self-views.
Decreased appraisal
Reactive tendencies to extensively appraise, contemplate, inhibit,
or otherwise to avoid sensations are prevented by increased capac-
ity for tolerance and cool awareness (Kent and Davis, 2010).
Non-reactivity scores from a trait mindfulness scale correlated
negatively with rumination and negative bias and predicted reduc-
ing automatic emotional responding to negative stimuli via the
insula after mindful breathing (Paul et al., 2013).
Availability of internal models
Consistent with the availability of internal models, mindfulness
meditation is reﬂexive and goes with conscious access to the
differentiated, rich features of each experience and enhanced
metacognition and self-regulation skills (Lutz et al., 2008). Aware-
ness of context and of the whole range of choices available
(i.e., availability of internal models) at any given moment is
increased. Mindfulness practice allegedly leads one to a clear but
less emotionally reactive awareness of the autobiographical sense
of identity that projects back into the past and forward into the
future (Lutz et al., 2008; Kent and Davis, 2010). In other words,
it appears that the availability and guidance by internal models
is increased, thereby decreasing pure reactivity, and increasing
resilience.
Focus on the here and now
In contrast to the open monitoring style of meditation such as
mindfulness, the focused attention/concentrative style of med-
itation, used in the training of mindfulness skills, entails the
capacities for monitoring the focus of attention and detecting
distraction, disengaging attention from the source of distraction,
and redirecting and engaging attention on the intended object
(Lutz et al., 2008). We suggest that these are typical right IFG/AI
functions in sustained attention (see Comparison with Other The-
ories). In both focused attention and openmonitoringmeditation,
there is focus on themoment,whichmay function to preventmind
wandering and obtain a ﬁeld perspective by preventing reactive
system involvement in sustained appraisal of a stimulus, elabora-
tion, inhibition, and rumination, and dorsal striatal involvement
in habitual behavior. Both practices may increase skills in adopt-
ing a ﬁeld perspective in the predictive system mode. Acting with
awareness is a component of mindfulness that is contrasted with
the concept of “automatic pilot” or habitual behavior in which
behaviors occur without awareness because attention is focused
elsewhere (Baer et al., 2004).
Supportive of an association between mindfulness and the ﬁeld
perspective are results in patients with a history of recurrent
depression, where the tendency to retrieve observer perspective
memories was associated with lower dispositional mindfulness
(and with greater negative self-evaluation and greater use of
avoidance; Kuyken and Moulds, 2009).
Although neuroimaging research on meditation is compli-
cated by individual differences in strategies and non-linear effects
of proﬁciency (Lutz et al., 2008), there is support for involve-
ment of reactive system areas in focused attention meditation
and of predictive system areas in open monitoring meditation.
For instance, the most consistent effect in a study of prac-
ticed novices and expert Buddhist monks was the deactivation
of the precuneus or PCC during focused attention meditation
in contrast to activation of these areas during open monitor-
ing meditation (Manna et al., 2010). In a PET study in which
participants rated the level of relaxation (∼open monitoring)
and attentional absorption (∼focused attention) during hypnosis,
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absorption-related activity was maximal in areas of the right
reactive system: the right IFG (BA 45/47), the AI and the right
inferior parietal lobule (Rainville et al., 2002). The IFG (BA 44)
also displayed strong coactivation with absorption related tha-
lamic activity. Absorption-related deactivations were found in
lateral parietal cortices and in the precuneus. In another study,
participants were scanned while they adopted either a reﬂec-
tive, extended self-reference that links experiences across time in
memory (which may involve the predictive system) or a momen-
tary experiential self-reference centered on the present moment
(possibly reactive system). The experiential focus yielded reduced
activity in predictive system areas such as mPFC, PCC, and hip-
pocampus, and increased engagement of reactive system areas
such as in the IFG, insula, and inferior parietal lobule (Farb et al.,
2007).
The role of the right IFG in establishing, maintaining, and
perhaps training skills in focused attention is illustrated in a
recent study investigated mind wandering and attention dur-
ing focused meditation by experienced practitioners (Hasenkamp
and Barsalou, 2012; Hasenkamp et al., 2012). Using subjective
input (e.g., participants pressed a button whenever they real-
ized their mind had wandered) to investigate different phases of
attention and mind wandering, the researchers found increased
DMN activation during mind wandering (consistent with Section
“The Wandering Mind”), while detection of mind wandering
was associated with bilateral IFG/AI (BA 47/13) and dorsal ACC
activation (consistent with those areas detecting the need for
effortful reactive system intervention; see Appraisal and Reap-
praisal in the Right and Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus). After
switching back to focus, during subsequent maintenance of atten-
tional focus (which may involve right IFG especially in demanding
conditions; see Comparison with Other Theories), there was
increased connectivity between right dorsolateral PFC and right
IFG/AI (BA 47/13). Individual differences in lifetime medita-
tion experience correlated negatively with activation of areas
including the right IFG/AI (BA47/13) and left IFG (BA45) dur-
ing switching from mind wandering to focus, which suggests
higher proﬁciency associated with decreased effortfulness. As
noticed by Hasenkamp and Barsalou (2012) and Hasenkamp
et al. (2012), the activation of right IFG/AI during detection,
switching and maintenance may reﬂect this area’s role in switch-
ing between attentional networks (for instance when during
predictive control a return to reactive control is needed; see
Appraisal and Reappraisal in the Right and Left Inferior Frontal
Gyrus).
Some studies found that training in mindfulness can reduce
activation of the DMN (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Tang et al.,
2009; Brewer et al., 2011). However, Brewer et al. (2011) addi-
tionally found increased functional connectivity in experienced
meditators between the PCC, dorsal ACC, and dorsolateral PFC,
i.e., between the reﬂective and executive parts of thepredictive con-
trol system (for similar results, see Taylor et al., 2013). Decreased
DMN activation of the DMN but increased connectivity with
the executive parts of the predictive control system may reﬂect
present-moment ﬁeld perspective (executive) awareness from the
predictive system at the exclusion of mind wandering that is due
to distraction from self-reﬂection and prospection.
A review of the literature extracted four components that seem
to make up mindfulness, labeled “self-observation skills,” “act-
ing with awareness,” “describing” (or “labeling”), and “accepting
without judgment” (Baer et al., 2004). We discussed the ﬁrst two
components and interpret the second two components as indicat-
ing implicit, effortless and non-distracting strategies (i.e., without
interventions in the form of effortful reappraisal or rumination)
for the integration of experience with internal models, which
would involve the left IFG.
Labeling
Labeling is the identifying, naming, and linguistic processing of the
emotions that arise in a certain situation (Lieberman et al., 2007).
Different studies showed that labeling, much like reappraisal,
results in decreased physiological arousal, decreased activity in
the amygdala and increased activity in left IFG including Broca’s
area, and in the right IFG (Torrisi et al., 2013). Studies of emotion
labeling of emotional prosody showed that implicit appraisal of
prosody recruits the right or bilateral IFG, while explicit labeling
requires the left IFG (Bach et al., 2008; Frühholz et al., 2012). Sim-
ilarly, if not accompanied by rumination (“think about yourself,
reﬂect who you are, about your goals, etc.,” activating left IFG/AI
BA 45/47/13, the amygdala, and DMN areas PCC/precuneus), a
self-referential mental state of making the actual emotional state
aware (“feel yourself, be aware about your current emotions and
bodily feelings,” activating the left IFG BA 44), is capable of
decreasing amygdala activation and attenuating emotional arousal
(Herwig et al., 2010). Brief, covert labeling of observed experience,
usingwords or short phrases, such as“aching,”“sadness,”or“want-
ing to move” is often encouraged in mindfulness training. Notably,
dispositionalmindfulness has been associatedwith increased bilat-
eral IFG (BA 47) and left insula activation and reduced bilateral
amygdala activity during an affect labeling task (Creswell et al.,
2007).
Further, during affect labeling, strong negative associations
were found between the right IFG (BA 47) and right amygdala
responses in participants high in mindfulness (Creswell et al.,
2007), perhaps reﬂecting control of appraisal by the reactive
system. Similar to the right reactive system activation during
focused attention meditation, this activation may be instrumen-
tal in learning or achieving mindfulness, by preventing effortful
(re)appraisal, rumination, or distraction. Dynamic causal model-
ing suggested that during affect labeling people in general show
dampening inﬂuences from the right IFG toward the amygdala,
as well as from the left IFG Broca’s area toward both the right
IFG and amygdala (Torrisi et al., 2013). This dampening inﬂuence
of the left IFG on right hemisphere reactive system areas may be
implicated in the decreased arousal following linguistic process-
ing, both in the observer perspective and during predictive system
control.
Accepting without judgment
To accept without judgment is to refrain from applying evaluative
labels such as good/bad, right/wrong, or worthwhile/worthless
and to allow reality to be as it is without attempts to avoid,
escape, or change it. This would facilitate integration of the expe-
rience with internal models without interventions in the form
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of effortful reappraisal or rumination. Indeed, left IFG activa-
tion in anticipation of uncontrollable pain related to less trait
denial coping (e.g., “I pretend that it hasn’t really happened”) and
more acceptance coping (e.g., “I learn to live with it”), suggesting
inclusion in internal models instead of avoiding the processing of
aversive experience (Salomons et al., 2007).
To summarize, PARCS provides a framework for understand-
ing characteristics and consequences of mindfulness, the processes
that facilitate mindfulness, and the accompanying brain acti-
vations. Mindfulness meditation facilitates a speciﬁc predictive
system control mode of awareness by stimulating a ﬁeld perspec-
tive through focusing on the here and now,whichmakes awareness
in predictive control easier to discriminate and separate from
the ruminative state which adopts an observer perspective. To
obtain this mode of control, several techniques are used to prevent
rumination, sustained appraisal, habitual behavior, prospection,
and mind wandering. Through this undistracted predictive con-
trol system mode of awareness, mindfulness increases resilience,
conscious access to the rich features of each experience, an auto-
biographical sense of identity that projects back into the past and
forward into the future, and enhanced metacognition and self-
regulation skills (i.e., availability of internal models to support
perception and action).
According to PARCS, prospection through predictive control
facilitates positive outcomes (see The Wandering Mind). Hence,
future research should determine whether positive consequences
of mindfulness meditation generalize to prospective mentation.
Perhaps the focus on the here and now during mindfulness medi-
tation only functions to facilitate a predictive system control mode
or to prevent sustained appraisal, habitual behavior, and espe-
cially rumination that is difﬁcult to discriminate fromprospection.
Another open question is whether the mindful state can involve
coactivation or functional connectivity with components of the
right hemisphere reactive system, generating a state in which
the availability of internal models produces a mindful quality to
appraisal. This last possibility could be part of a natural ﬂow of
information processing, unobstructed by interrupting processes
(Figure 3).
The direction of ﬂow of information in Figure 3 is certainly
not exclusive, but illustrates the natural direction from appraisal
of novelty, to reappraisal and inclusion in internal models, to
internal models guiding and increasing the richness of perception.
The switch from right IFG to the verbal left IFG is facilitated by
labeling of experience (Torrisi et al., 2013). Next, the left IFG facil-
itates intake in internal models (Perlovsky and Ilin, 2013) and is
biased toward encoding (Tulving et al., 1994; Habib et al., 2003).
Subsequently, coactivation of internal model areas with right IFG
is associated with vivid experience (e.g., in imagery; Zvyagintsev
et al., 2013) and there is a bias toward episodic recall in right IFG
(Tulving et al., 1994; Habib et al., 2003). The information from
internal models provides context to perception in the right hemi-
sphere, facilitating observing skills and the richness of experience
(Rotenberg, 1994; Hirsh et al., 2013).
DISCUSSION
In the present article, we have outlined how PARCS pro-
vides a framework to understand characteristics of internally
FIGURE 3 | Mindfulness as a natural flow of information processing
(triangle in the figure), unobstructed by interrupting processes
(outward arrows) of sustained appraisal or excessive inhibition of
appraisal, rumination, prospective mind wandering, unconscious
habitual behavior.
directed cognition and self-reﬂection, such as different qual-
ities of awareness, mind wandering, mindfulness, and view-
points during episodic recall and imagery. These characteristics
may help discriminating the different mental states. The shifts
between reactive and predictive control are part of processes
that enable performance learning, intake and integration of
new information with internal models, habituation of arousal
from orienting responses, and integrated experience of the here,
now and novel in a continuous personal context that supports
understanding.
We also discussed cognitive control functions of the IFG that
were at the same time similar and differentiated between the hemi-
spheres. In both hemispheres, the IFG takes over control and
induces elaborative processing when more ﬂuent feedforward or
automated processing fails or seems inappropriate or risky. Dif-
ferences between left and right IFG on the other hand, appear to
reﬂect specialization in the left IFG in not only verbal communica-
tion between individuals, but also, perhapsmore fundamentally, in
communication between reactive experience and predictive inter-
nal models by supporting the integration of novel information in
those models.
Throughout the present article, we hope we have demonstrated
how PARCS theory provides a promising framework that can inte-
grate and explain a host of cognitive functions along with their
phenomenological correlates. PARCS suggests functions and ways
to discriminatemental states. Furthermore, PARCSprovides a new
way of thinking about many mental states. For instance, rumi-
nation and prospective mind wandering are often portrayed as
purelymaladaptivemental states. By contrast, PARCS suggests that
prospective mind wandering reﬂects predictive control function,
while rumination sometimes reﬂects elaborative reappraisal that
aims to facilitate future predictive control by resolving incongru-
ence of informationwith internalmodels (Andrews andThomson,
2009).
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PARCS also provides a framework for neuroimaging stud-
ies that try to delineate the neural mechanisms of mental state
dynamics. For instance, PARCS predicts overlapping activations
during reappraisal compared to self-rumination. Additionally, the
dynamics of mindfulness are perhaps best captured by functional
connectivity between the DMN and executive subparts of the
predictive system, and processes that facilitate experience in the
here and now and simultaneous extended awareness provided by
context from internal models.
Finally, on an applied level, we presented information that may
be used to facilitate shifts between mental states, for instance
in the context of psychotherapy or self-help. Making oneself
aware of interoceptive or external signals is the ﬁrst step for
their reappraisal (Gross and John, 2003) and for psychothera-
peutic interventions that direct awareness away from for instance
painful feelings toward pleasant aspects. The distancing quality
of an observer perspective may be optimal in phases of therapy
when emotional information needs to be elaborated upon with-
out the client becoming overwhelmed by emotions. By contrast,
the experiential nature of the ﬁeld perspective may support the
recovery of emotional memories that are being avoided. Alterna-
tively, when chronic and unproductive rumination appears to be
the main problem, mindfulness training and a ﬁeld perspective
can help in achieving a rumination-free mind state.
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